Contextual Centrality: Going Beyond Network Structures by Leng, Yan et al.
Contextual centrality: going beyond network structure
Yan Leng 1†, Yehonatan Yella2, Rodrigo Ruiz1, Alex Pentland1
1Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, USA
2Albert Einstein College of Medicine, New York, USA
† To whom correspondence should be addressed; E-mail: yleng@mit.edu
Centrality is a fundamental network property which ranks nodes by their structural import-
ance. However, this alone may not predict successful diffusion in many applications, such as viral
marketing and political campaigns. We propose contextual centrality, which integrates structural
positions, the diffusion process, and, most importantly, relevant node characteristics. It nicely gen-
eralizes and relates to standard centrality measures. We test the effectiveness of contextual central-
ity in predicting the eventual outcomes in the adoption of microfinance and weather insurance. Our
empirical analysis shows that the contextual centrality of first-informed individuals has higher pre-
dictive power than that of other standard centrality measures. Further simulations show that when
the diffusion occurs locally, contextual centrality can identify nodes whose local neighborhoods
contribute positively. When the diffusion occurs globally, contextual centrality signals whether
diffusion may generate negative consequences. Contextual centrality captures more complicated
dynamics on networks and has significant implications for network-based interventions.
Individuals, institutions, and industries are increasingly connected in networks where the behavior of
one individual entity may generate a global effect1–3. Centrality is a fundamental network property which
captures an entity’s ability to impact macro processes, such as information diffusion on social networks1,
cascading failures in financial institutions3, and the spreading of market inefficiencies across industries2.
Many interesting studies have found that the structural positions of individual nodes in a network explain
a wide range of behaviors and consequences. Degree centrality predicts who is the first to be infected
in a contagion4. Eigenvector centrality corresponds to the incentives to maximize social welfare5. Katz
centrality is proportional one’s power in strategic interactions in network games6. Diffusion centrality de-
picts an individual’s capability of spreading in information diffusion7. These centrality measures operate
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similarly, aiming to reach a large crowd via diffusion, and are solely dependent on the network structure.
However, several pieces of empirical evidence show that reaching a large crowd may generate adverse
effects. For example, sales on Groupon, public announcements of popular items on Goodreads, and online
video platforms are successful in reaching a large population of customers. However, studies show that
these strategies lower online reviews by reaching the population of people who hold negative opinions
about the product8–10. Let us further consider two motivating examples to demonstrate the importance of
accounting for node characteristics.
Example 1. Viral marketing. During a viral marketing campaign, the marketing department aims to
attract more individuals to adopt the focal product. If we have ex-ante information about the customers’
likelihood of adoption, we can utilize it to better target individuals who have higher chances of adoption
and avoid wasting resources on those otherwise.
Example 2. Political campaign. Typical Get-Out-The-Vote (GOTV) campaigns include direct mail,
phone calls, and social-network advertisement11,12. However, rather than merely aiming to transform
nonvoters to voters, a GOTV strategy should target voters who are more likely to vote for the campaigner’s
candidate.
In this paper, we introduce contextual centrality, which builds upon diffusion centrality proposed in
Banerjee et al. and captures relevant node characteristics in the objective of the diffusion13,7. Moreover,
contextual centrality aggregates these characteristics over one’s neighborhood, which is defined by the
diffusion process. It generalizes and nests degree, eigenvector, Katz, and diffusion centrality. When the
spreadability (the product between the diffusion rate p and the largest eigenvalue λ1 of the adjacency
matrix) and the diffusion period T are large, contextual centrality linearly scales with eigenvector, Katz,
and diffusion centrality. The sign of the scale factor is determined by the joint distribution of nodes’
contributions to the objective of the diffusion and their corresponding structural positions.
We perform an empirical analysis of the diffusion of microfinance and weather insurance showing that
the contextual centrality of the first-informed individuals better predicts the adoption decisions than that
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of the other centrality measures mentioned above. Moreover, simulations on the synthetic data show how
network properties and node characteristics collectively influence the performance of different centrality
measures. Further, we illustrate the effectiveness of contextual centrality over a wide range of diffusion
rates with simulations on the real-world networks and relevant node characteristics in viral marketing and
political campaigns.
Contextual centrality
Given a set ofN individuals, the adjacency matrix of the network is A, anN -by-N symmetric matrix. The
entry Aij equals 1 if there exists a link between node i and node j, and 0 otherwise. Let D = diag(d),
where di =
∑N
j=1Aij denotes the degree of node i. With Singular Value Decomposition, we have
A = UΛUT , where Λ = diag{Λ} = {λ1, λ2, ..., λn} in a descending order and the corresponding
eigenvectors are {U1,U2, ...,Un} with U1 being the leading eigenvector. We let ◦ denote the Hadamard
product (i.e., element-wise multiplication). We use bold lowercase variables for vectors and bold upper
case variables for matrices.
The diffusion process in this paper follows the independent cascade model14. It starts from an initial
active seed. When node u becomes active, it has a single chance to activate each currently inactive neigh-
bor v with probability Puv, where P ∈ RN×N . We follow the terminology by Koschutzki to categorize
degree, eigenvector, and Katz centrality as reachability-based centrality measures15. Reachability-based
centrality measures aim to score a certain node v by the expected number of individuals activated if v
is activated initially, s(v,A,P), and hence tend to rank nodes that can reach more nodes in the network
higher. In particular,
s(v,A,P) =
N∑
i
ri(v,A,P), (1)
where ri(v,A,P) denotes the probability that i is activated if v is initially activated14,16,17. In practice,
s(v,A,P) is hard to estimate. Different reachability-based centrality measures estimate it in different
ways.
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Diffusion centrality extends and generalizes these standard centrality measures13. It operates on the
assumption that the activation probability of an individual i is correlated with the number of times i
‘hears’ the information originating from the individual to be scored. Diffusion centrality measures how
extensively the information spreads as a function of the initial node13. In other words, diffusion centrality
scores node v by the expected number of times some piece of information originating from v is heard by
others within a finite number of time periods T , s′(v,A,P, T ),
s′(v,A,P, T ) =
N∑
i
r′i(v,A,P, T ), (2)
where r′i(v,A,P, T ) is the expected number of times individual i receives the information if v is seeded.
Eq. (2) has at least two advantages over Eq. (1). First, r′i(v,A,P, T ) is computationally more efficient
than tedious simulations to get ri(v,A,P). Second, it nests degree, eigenvector, and Katz centrality7i.
Both Eq. (1) and (2) assume that individuals are homogeneous and contribute equally to the objectives
if they have been activated. However, in many real-world scenarios, such as the two examples mentioned
above, the payoff for the campaigner does not grow with the size of the cascade. Instead, different nodes
contribute differently. Formally, let yi be the contribution of individual i to the cascade payoff upon
being activated. Note that yi is context-dependent and is measured differently in different scenarios. For
example, in a market campaign, yi can be i’s likelihood of adoption. In a political campaign, yi can be the
likelihood that i votes for the political campaigner’s political party. With the independent cascade model,
an individual v should be scored according to the cascade payoff if v is first-activated, sc(v,A,p). With
this, we present the following equation as a generalization and extension to Eq. (1) with heterogeneous y,
cascade payoff: sc(v,A,p) =
N∑
i
ri(v,A,P)yi. (3)
Similar to diffusion centrality, we score nodes with the following approximated cascade payoff,
iIt is worth noting that Eq. (1) and (2) differ in a couple of ways. First, since r′i(v,A,P, T ) is the expected number of times i
hears a piece of information, it may exceed 1. Meanwhile, since ri(v,A,P) is the probability that i receives the information, it is
bounded by 1. Second, in independent cascade model, each activated individual has a single chance to activate the non-activated
neighbors. However, with the random walks of information transmission in contextual centrality, each activated individual has
multiple chances with decaying probability to activate their neighbors.
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s′c(v,A,p, T ), with heterogeneous y,
approximated cascade payoff: s′c(v,A,P, T ) =
N∑
i
r′i(v,A,P, T )yi. (4)
This formulation generalizes diffusion centrality and inherits its nice properties in nesting existing
reachability-based centrality measures. Moreover, it is more easier to compute than Eq. (3)ii. With this
scoring function, we now formally propose contextual centrality.
Definition 1 Contextual centrality (CC) approximates the cascade payoff within a given number of time
periods T as a function of the initial node accounting for individuals’ contribution to the cascade payoff.
CC(A,P, T,y) :=
T∑
t=0
(P ◦A)ty, (5)
Heterogeneous diffusion rates across individuals are difficult to collect and estimate in real-world
applications. Therefore, in the following analysis, we assume a homogeneous diffusion rate p across all
edges. Hence, P ◦A in Eq. (5) is reduced to pA. Similar to diffusion centrality, contextual centrality is a
random-walk-based centrality, where (pA)t measures the expected number of walks of length t between
each individual pair and T is the maximum walk-length considered. Since T is the longest communication
period, larger T indicates a longer period for diffusion (e.g., a movie that stays in the market for a long
period) while smaller T indicates a shorter diffusion period (e.g., a coupon that expires soon). One the one
hand, when pλ1 is larger than 1, CC approaches infinity as T grows. On the other hand, when pλ1 < 1,
CC is finite for T = ∞, which can be understood as a lack of virality, expressed in a fizzling out of the
diffusion process with time. In fact, the specific value of pλ1 can be used to bound the maximum possible
CC given the norm of the score vector y. As presented in proposition 1 in the Supporting Information, the
upper bound for CC grows with pλ1 and the norm of the score vector.
iiThe computational complexity of the algorithm to score according to Eq. (3) is O(NMT ), where M is the average degree
and T is the paths lengths that has been inspected. Note that the computational complexity of the formulation (5) is O(NMT ).
We repeat the operation of multiplying a vector of length N with a sparse matrix which has an average of M entries per row for
T times. This significantly reduces the run time.
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Let us further illustrate the relationship between CC and diffusion centrality, DC for shortiii. We
can represent y as, y = σ(y) · z + y · 1, where σ(y) and z are the standard deviation and the z-score
normalization of y. Using the linearity of CC with respect to y, we can write
CC(A, p, T,y) = σ(y) · CC(A, p, T, z) + y · CC(A, p, T,1︸ ︷︷ ︸
DC
)
(6)
Eq. (6) shows the trade-off between the standard deviation σ(y) and the mean y of the contribution
vector in CC. When y dominates over σ(y), network topology is more important in CC and it produces
similar rankings to DC. If the graph is Erdos-Renyi and T is small enough, then, on expectation, the
term y · DC dominates as the size of the network approaches infinity, as presented in Theorem 1 in the
Supporting Information. However, when σ(y) dominates over y, CC and DC generate very different
rankings.
The relevant node characteristics y provides the ex-ante estimation about one’s contribution. Whether
to incorporate y is the main difference between our centrality and existing centrality measures. In the real-
world data, the observation or estimation on y can be noisy, biased or stochastic. Therefore, we discuss
the robustness of contextual centrality in responses to perturbations in y in the Supporting Information.
We define the following terms, which we use throughout the paper:
• Spreadability (pλ1) captures the capability of the campaign to diffuse on the network depending on
the diffusion probability (p) via a certain communication channel, and the largest eigenvalue (λ1)
of the network.
• Standardized average contribution ( yσ(y)) is computed as the average of the contributions normal-
ized by the standard deviation of the contribution. The sign of yσ(y) indicates whether the average
contribution is positive or not. Moreover, the larger the magnitude of yσ(y) , the more homogeneous
the contributions are.
iiiIn Banerjee et al. 13, DC =
∑T
t=1(pA)
t. To derive the following relationship between CC and DC, we add the score of
reaching the first seeded individual into computing diffusion centrality. Hence, DC =
∑T
t=0(pA)
t. Adding the first seeded
individual into the scoring function produces the same ranking as the one used in Banerjee et al.
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• Primary contribution (UT1 y) measures the joint distribution of the structural importance and nodal
contributions. It captures whether people who dominate important positions have positive contri-
butions or not.
Properties of contextual centrality when pλ1 > 1 and T is large. Let us first provide the approxima-
tion of contextual centrality in this condition, which reveals one of the prominent advantages of contextual
centrality. By the Perron-Frobenius Theorem, we have |λj | ≤ λ1 for every j. Moreover, if we assume
that the graph is non-periodic, then in fact |λj | < λ1 for all j 6= 1. Note that the typical random graph is
not periodic, so this assumption is reasonable. Thus, when pλ1 > 1, the term (pλ1)t grows exponentially
faster than (pλj)t for j 6= 1 so that the j = 1 term dominates for sufficiently large values of T , and we
obtain the approximation for contextual centrality (CCapprox):
CC =
n∑
j=1
T∑
t=0
(pλj)
tUjU
T
j y ≈ CCapprox =
( T∑
t=0
(pλ1)
tUT1 y
)
U1. (7)
This approximation reveals some desirable properties of contextual centrality. Crucially, CCapprox is
simply a scalar multiple of the leading eigenvector when pλ1 > 1 and T is large. Therefore, the sign of
UT1 y determines the direction of the relationship between CCapprox and eigenvector centrality. By Perron-
Frobenius Theorem, all elements in this leading eigenvector are nonnegative. Thus, the approximated
cascade payoff, Eq. (4), for seeding any individual is nonpositive if UT1 y < 0, pλ > 1 and T is large. This
shows that in this condition the approximated cascade payoff is nonpositive for seeding any individual, so
the campaigner should select a diffusion channel with lower diffusion rate to take advantage of the local
neighborhood with positive contributions. Eq. (7) naturally suggests the following relationships between
CCapprox and eigenvector centrality.
• If UT1 y > 0, CCapprox and eigenvector centrality produce the same rankings.
• If UT1 y < 0, CCapprox and eigenvector centrality produce the opposite rankings.
The approximation does not hold when UT1 y = 0, which is also unlikely to happen in practice. Hence,
we disregard this case. Similarly, we relate contextual centrality to diffusion centrality (CDiffusion) and
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Katz centrality (CKatz),
CDiffusion ∝
∞∑
t=1
(pλ1)
tU1(U
T
1 1) =
∑∞
t=1(pλ1)
t(UT1 1)∑T
t=0(pλ1)
tUT1 y
CCapprox,
CKatz ∝
∞∑
t=0
(αλ1)
tU1(U
T
1 1) =
∑∞
t=0(αλ1)
t(UT1 1)∑T
t=0(pλ1)
tUT1 y
CCapprox,
(8)
where α is the decay factor in Katz centrality. Similar to Eq. (7), all terms on the right-hand-side of Eq. (8)
are positive except for UT1 y, which similarly determines the direction of the relationship.
Results
Predictive power of contextual centrality We study two real-world empirical settings, adopting mi-
crofinance in 43 Indian villagesiv and adopting weather insurance in 47 Chinese villagesv. In each setting,
there is a set of first-informed households in each village who went on to spread the information. We eval-
uate the adoption outcome of all other households in the village which are not first-informed. We use the
adoption likelihood for the contribution vector y in computing contextual centrality, which is predicted
using a model based on the adoption decisions of the first-informed households. Similar to Banerjee et
al.13, we evaluate the R2 of a linear regression model, where the independent variable is the average
centrality of first-informed households and the dependent variable is the fraction of non-first-informed
households in a village which adopted - controlled by the village size. In Fig. 1, we show how the R2
for various measures of centrality varies with pλ1, in which the choice of p influences the two centrality
measures that account for the diffusion process - diffusion centrality and contextual centrality. We see that
the contextual centrality outperforms all other standard centrality measures, which indicates that market-
ing campaigners or social planners will benefit from using contextual centrality as the seeding strategy to
maximize the participation. This result also highlights that utilizing ex-ante information about customers’
likelihood of adoption helps to design better targeting strategies. Similar results without control variables
and with more control variables are presented in the Supporting Information as a robustness check.
ivThe data is made public by Banerjee et al. 13.
vThe data is made public by Cai et al. 18.
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(a) Adoption of microfinance in Indian villages (b) Adoption of weather insurance in Chinese villages
Figure 1: Predictive power of contextual centrality. We show how the average centrality of first-informed
individuals predicts the eventual adoption rate of non-first-informed individuals in (a) microfinance and
(b) weather insurance. The y-axis shows the 95% confidence interval ofR2 computed from 1000 bootstrap
samples from ordinary least squares regressions controlling for village size. The x-axis shows varying
values for pλ1, which influences only diffusion centrality and contextual centrality.
Performance of contextual centrality relative to other centralities on random networks To better
understand CC’s performance with respect to different parameters (pλ1, yσ(y) ), we next perform sim-
ulations on randomly generated synthetic networks and contribution vectors (y). To compare the per-
formance of contextual centrality against the other centralities, we use ‘relative change’ (calculated as
a−b
max(|a|,|b|) , where a is a given centrality’s average payoff and b is the maximum average payoff of the
other centralities)vi. Fig. 2 displays the relative change between CC’s average payoff and the maximum
average payoff of the other centralities aggregated over 100 runs of simulations for varying values of yσ(y)
and pλ1 on three different types of simulated graphs. We can see that CC performs well when y < 0,
pλ1 < 1, and yσ(y) is small in magnitude. We will now discuss each of these cases in more detail.
When y < 0, maximizing the reach of the cascade is not ideal because that will result in a cascade
viWe chose ‘relative change’ for comparison since it gives a sense of when the payoffs are different from the optimal centrality
while keeping the magnitudes of the payoffs in perspective. This measure has some desirable properties. First, its value is
necessarily between -2 and 2, so our scale for comparison is consistent across scenarios. Second, its magnitude does not exceed
1 unless a and b differ in sign, so we can tell if a centrality gets a positive average payoff while the rest do not.
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payoff which more closely reflects y. CC differs from the other centralities in that it does not try to
maximize the reach of the cascade. Note the dark blue diagonal band present in all plots in Fig. 2. Since
the magnitude of the relative change exceeds 1 only when the values being compared have opposite signs,
this region shows that there are many settings where the standard average contribution is negative, yet CC
achieves a positive payoff while the other centralities do not.
When pλ1 is small, it is essential to seed an individual whose local neighborhood has higher individual
contributions since there is not much risk of diffusing to individuals with lower individual contributionsvii.
This highlights CC’s advantage in discriminating the local neighborhoods with positive payoffs from those
with negative payoffs while the other centralities cannot.
When yσ(y) is small in magnitude, CC takes advantage of the greater relative variations between con-
tributions. As yσ(y) → +∞, Eq. (6) tells us that CC will seed similar to DC, which explains why CC loses
some of its advantage. However, as yσ(y) → −∞, Eq. (6) tells us that CC will seed opposite to DC, which
explains why CC maintains an advantage.
We briefly comment on the regions where CC does not seem to offer an advantage. CC appears to do
slightly worse when y > 0 and pλ1 is a bit greater than 1. We expect that when pλ1 > 1, CC would offer
less of an advantage since the cascade reaches most individuals in the network. However, Eq. (7) (and to
some extent Eq. (6)) suggests that CC should seed similar to the other centralities. Note that in Fig. 2d,
which averages over the samples of all three graph types, CC performs better. Thus, we conclude that
this is due to the high variance of the cascade payoffs in this region. CC also seems to perform poorly
when y = 0. This is because as pλ1 increases, the payoff more closely reflects y, which means that CC’s
average payoff and the maximum average payoff of the other centralities are very close to 0 and often
have different signs, so the relative change would appear to be large. In these two regions where CC does
not seem to offer an advantage, no single centrality dominates the rest, which shows that there are large
relative variations in these regions. Similar figures to Fig. 2 for all other centrality measures used in this
viiAs an extreme case, consider pλ1 = 0. In this case, the diffusion rate is 0, so seeding an individual with a high individual
payoff makes much more sense than seeding an individual with high topological importance.
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(a) Barabasi-Albert model (b) Erdos-Renyi model
(c) Watts-Strogatz model (d) All models
Figure 2: Performance of contextual centrality relative to other centralities on random networks. Each plot
shows the relative change, computed as a−bmax(|a|,|b|) where a is CC’s average payoff and b is the maximum
average payoff of the other centralities, for varying values of yσ(y) and pλ1. The plots correspond to
the results on random networks generated according to the Barabasi-Albert, Erdos-Renyi, Watts-Strogatz
models, and all models.
paper can be found in the Supporting Information.
Performance of contextual centrality relative to other centralities on real-world networks Next,
we analyze the performance of contextual centrality in achieving the cascade payoff, as defined in Eq. (3),
using simulations on three real-world settings, namely adoption of microfinance, adoption of the weather
insurance, and political voting campaign. To compare the performance of contextual centrality against the
maximum of centrality measures for each condition, we use ‘relative change’ as before. We observe the
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(a) Campaign for microfinance (b) Campaign for weather insurance (c) Campaign for votes
Figure 3: Performance of contextual centrality relative to other centralities on real-world networks. Each
plot shows the relative change for varying values of pλ1. We compare contextual centrality with degree
centrality, diffusion centrality, eigenvector centrality, Katz centrality, and random seeding.
network structure (A) and adoption decisions in the campaign for microfinance and weather insurance.
In the campaign for political votes, we generate the network structure and the contribution vector from
the empirical distributions. We vary the diffusion rate of p in the independent cascade model to examine
how it influences the performances of different centrality measures. We see that in (a) campaign for
microfinance and (b) campaign for weather insurance, CC outperforms the other centralities when pλ1
is small. While in (c) campaign for political votes, CC outperforms the other centralities for all pλ1.
The standardized average contributions of (a), (b), and (c) are 2.29, 5.27, and -2.22, respectively. This
result is consistent with the results presented in Fig. 2. It shows that contextual centrality can greatly
outperform other centrality measures when the standardized average contribution is negative for a wide
range of pλ1. When standardized average contribution is positive, contextual centrality outperforms other
centrality measures when the spreadability is small and achieves comparable result with other centralities
as the spreadability further increases.
Approximation of contextual centrality and the importance of primary contribution A negative
contextual centrality score indicates that seeding with the particular node will generate a negative payoff.
Therefore, we design a seeding strategy in which we seed only if the maximum of contextual centrality
is nonnegative. As shown by the blue dashed and solid lines in Fig. 4, the new seeding strategy, “seed
12
Figure 4: Average cascade payoff for variations of contextual centrality and eigenvector centrality. The x-
axis is pλ1, and the y-axis is the average payoff, with the shaded region as the 95% confidence intervals.
For ‘eigenvector adjusted’ centrality, we multiply eigenvector centrality with the primary contribution
UT1 y. For ’seed nonnegative’, we only seed if the maximum of the centrality measure is nonnegative,
otherwise it is named as ‘seed always’.
nonnegative”, performs better than always seeding the top-ranked individual. Building upon Eq. (7),
we introduce a variation of eigenvector centrality, “eigenvector adjusted”, as the product of eigenvector
centrality and the primary contribution (UT1 y). This variation of eigenvector centrality performs on par
with contextual centrality as pλ1 grows large as expected according to Eq. (7). “Eigenvector adjusted”
greatly outperforms eigenvector centrality viii. Comparing the strategies in Fig. 4, the new strategy of
accounting for the sign of the centrality measures improves the average payoffs by an order of magnitude.
This pattern also highlights the importance of the primary contribution in campaign strategies. We present
figures for the analogous variations of the other centralities in the Supporting Information.
Homophily and the maximum of contextual centrality Homophily is a long-standing phenomenon in
social networks that describes the tendency of individuals with similar characteristics to associate with one
viiiAnother variation of eigenvector centrality is to adjust eigenvector centrality by y. Note that the sign of UT1 y does not
always equal y. When the signs differ, seeding only when UT1 y is positive produces a higher cascade payoff when pλ1 is not
too large. However, as pλ1 further increases and the diffusion saturates most of the network, the sign of y predicts that of the
cascade payoff. However, larger pλ1 is not as interesting as smaller ones, which happens more frequently in real life. We present
average cascade payoff comparing the two strategies when y(UT1 y) < 0 in the Supplementary Information.
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Figure 5: Homophily and maximum of contextual centrality when pλ1 < 1. We regress the maximum of
contextual centrality on homophily after controlling for yσ(y) and pλ1. The y-axis is the OLS coefficients
of homophily (with the vertical line as the 95% confidence interval) and the x-axis corresponds to three
types of networks. We perform the analysis separately for yσ(y) being larger than, smaller than and equals
to zero.
another19. The strength of homophily is measured by the difference in the contributions of the neighbors,∑N
i,j Aij(yi−yj)2. We analyze the relationship between the strength of homophily and the approximated
cascade payoff by seeding the highest-ranked node in contextual centrality. After controlling for yσ(y) and
pλ1, we regress the maximum of the contextual centrality on the strength of homophily of the network
separately for three conditions of yσ(y) . When the spreadability of contextual centrality is small, stronger
homophily tends to correlate with a large approximated cascade payoff across all graph types. This result
shows that stronger homophily of the network predicts higher approximated cascade payoff with small
spreadability. When the network is Barabasi-Albert and yσ(y) > 0, the relationship is the strongest. As
the spreadability further increases, the correlation between contextual centrality and homophily drops
dramatically, and thereby we exclude the scenarios when pλ1 > 1.
Discussion
Contextual centrality sheds light on the understanding of node importance in networks by emphasizing
node characteristics relevant to the objective of the diffusion other than the structural topology, which is
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vital for a wide range of applications such as marketing or political campaigns on social networks. Not-
ably, nodal contributions to the objective, the diffusion probability, and network topology jointly produce
an effective campaign strategy. It should be obvious up to now with the thorough simulations in this study
that exposing a large portion of the population in the diffusion is not always desirable. When the spreadab-
ility is small, contextual centrality effectively ranks the nodes whose local neighborhoods generate larger
cascade payoffs the highest. When the spreadibility is large, the primary contribution tends to predict
the sign of the approximated cascade payoff. This suggests that when the primary contribution is negat-
ive the campaigner should reduce the spreadability of the campaign to take advantage of the individuals
whose local neighborhoods generate positive approximated cascade payoff in aggregation. Resorting to
campaign channels with lower diffusion probability and less viral features, such as direct mail, can re-
duce spreadability. Moreover, as the standardized average contribution increases, the contribution vector
becomes comparatively more homogeneous and comparatively less important than the network structure.
Therefore, when the average contribution is positive, seeding with contextual centrality becomes similar
to seeding with diffusion centrality.
Contextual centrality emphasizes the importance of incorporating node characteristics that are exo-
genous to the network structure and the dynamic process. More broadly, contextual centrality provides
a generic framework for future studies to analyze the joint effect of network structure, nodal character-
istics, and the dynamic process. Other than applications on social networks, contextual centrality can be
applied to analyzing a wide range of networks, such as the biology networks (e.g., rank the importance of
genes by using the size of their evolutionary family as the contribution vector20), the financial networks
(e.g., rank the role of institutions in risk propagation in financial crisis with their likelihoods of failure as
the contribution vector3), and the transportation networks (e.g., rank the importance of airports with the
passengers flown per year as the contribution vector21 ).
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Methods
In this study, we compare contextual centrality with diffusion centrality and other widely-adopted reachability-
based centrality measures - degree, eigenvector, and Katz centrality. We compute degree centrality by
taking the degree of each node, normalized by N − 1. We compute eigenvector centrality by taking
the leading eigenvector U1 with unit length and nonnegative entries. We compute Katz centrality as∑∞
t=0(αA)
t1, setting α, which should be strictly less than λ−11 , to 0.9 · λ−11 . We compute diffusion
centrality as
∑T
t=1(pA)
t1. For both diffusion and contextual centrality, we set T = 16, except for the
microfinance in Indian villages setting, where we set T as done by Banerjee et al.13.
Simulations of the diffusion process in each setting follow the independent cascade model14. For each
centrality, the highest ranked node is set to be the initial seed. We compute cascade payoff by summing up
the individual contributions of all the nodes reached in the cascade. For each parameter tested in different
settings, we run 100 simulations.
In the empirical analysis of microfinance in Indian villages and weather insurance in Chinese villages,
we build models to predict the adoption likelihood to use as y in computing contextual centrality. For
each setting, we use the data provided in Banerjee et al.13 and Cai et al.18, respectively, as inputs to a
feed-forward neural network trained to predict the adoption likelihood based on the adoption decisions
of first-informed individuals. For the microfinance in Indian villages, the covariates include village size,
quality of access to electricity, quality of latrines, number of beds, number of rooms, the number of beds
per capita, and the number of rooms per capita. For the weather insurance in Chinese villages setting, 39
of the provided characteristics are selected as inputs by choosing those for which all households had data
after removing households with many missing characteristics.
For the political campaign experiment in Turkey, we use individual home and work locations to build
a network and regional voting data to sample voting outcomes to use as y. Individuals belonging to the
same home neighborhood are connected according to the Watts-Strogatz model with a maximum of 10
neighbors. Same for the work neighborhoods. These two networks are superimposed to form the final
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network. Since we do not know the political voting preferences on an individual level, individual voting
outcomes are sampled to match voting data on a regional level. Specifically, we let the actual fraction of
the population that voted for the AK party in an individual’s home neighborhood be the probability that
individual votes for the AK party. We let yi = +1 represent a vote for AK party and yi = −1 represent a
vote for any other party. We sample a new set of voting outcomes from the regional voting distributions
for each diffusion simulation.
For the synthetic setting, we generate a new random graph for each simulation according to Barabasi-
Albert, Erdos-Renyi, and Watts-Strogatz models. The size n of each graph varies between 30 and 300.
For Barabasi-Albert, m varied between 1 and n. For Erdos-Renyi, p varies between 0 and 1. For Watts-
Strogatz, k varies between lnn and n, and p varies between 0 and 1. Individual contributions y are
sampled from a normal distribution with unit standard deviation. Note that the scale of y does not change
the rankings of contextual centrality.
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1 Properties of contextual centrality
1.1 The relationship between contextual centrality and other centrality measures
Degree, eigenvector, Katz, diffusion, and contextual centrality can all be expressed as specific cases of
a simple recurrence relation with an intuitive explanation. Roughly speaking, a node’s importance in
a network can be broken down into two parts: its influence on other nodes in the network through its
neighbors, and its individual contribution to the cascade payoff.
Let ct be the importance (i.e., centrality) of all nodes in the network at time step t. One way to
capture the notion of each node’s influence on other nodes in the network is through Act−1, where A is
the adjacency matrix of the network. This term effectively sums up the importance of the neighbors of
each node. With this in mind, we can express ct as,
ct = αAct−1 + β, (9)
where α is a constant and β is the individual contribution of each node in the network. It is, of course,
possible to parameterize α, β, or A by t as well, but for simplicity let us assume they remain constant.
Expanding this recurrence, we get
ct = (αA)
tc0 +
t−1∑
i=0
(αA)iβ. (10)
Now if we substitute α = p, β = y, and c0 = y, then cT is exactly equal to CC. Substitutions can be
done for all the centralities discussed above and are summarized in Table 1.
Contextual centrality is developed upon and generalizes diffusion centrality, but there are two im-
portant differences. First, all nodes passed through by the random walk contribute positively and homo-
geneously in diffusion centrality, while the main advantage of contextual centrality is allowing for the
heterogeneous contributions. Second, the random walk of contextual centrality starts from the chosen
seed, while that of diffusion centrality starts from the neighbors of the chosen seed. Under the condition
that y is positive and constant for all entries, contextual centrality inherits the nice nesting properties of
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Table 1: Centralities defined by ct = αAct−1 + β.
Centrality α β c0 t
Degree 1 0 1 1
Eigenvector 1 0 1 ∞
Katz < 1λ1 1 1 ∞
Diffusion p 1 1 T
Contextual p y y T
diffusion centrality, which encompasses and spans the gap between degree centrality, eigenvector central-
ity, and Katz centrality. In particular, CC is proportional to degree centrality when T = 1, proportional to
eigenvector centrality as T → ∞ when p ≥ λ−11 , and proportional to Katz centrality when T = ∞ and
p < λ−11 . Proof can be found in Banerjee et al.
22.
Contextual centrality is also similar to Katz centrality, but we highlight two crucial differences. First,
contextual centrality is more general in that p can be larger than λ−11 and provides essential insights into
this region. Second, we allow T to vary according to the specific setting while in Katz centrality the
diffusion period T is infinite. T carries important implications. For the product that is effective in a short
period, such as a coupon that will expire within a day, T is relatively small compared with the diffusion
of a new phone which will be on the market for much longer.
1.2 Relationship between approximated cascade payoff and cascade payoff
Contextual centrality aims to maximize objective (4), which provides an approximation to cascade payoff,
as in objective (3), by an independent cascade model. In Fig. 6, we analyze the Spearman’s and Pearson
correlation between the two concerning different spreadability. Both correlation measures decrease as
spreadability increases from 0 to 1 and increase afterward. On the bulk part, the Spearman’s correlation
between the two is higher than Pearson correlation and is around 0.9 or higher. Note that pλ1 = 1 is
the phase transition in network contagion with the Susceptible-Infected (SI) model and is known as the
epidemics threshold23. This may explain why we see a different behavior close to pλ1 = 1.
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Figure 6: Relationship between approximated cascade payoff and cascade payoff. The y-axis and x-axis
display the correlation and the spreadability ( pλ1) respectively. Pearson and Spearman’s correlation are
shown in blue and orange color respectively.
1.3 Game-theoretic interpretation of contextual centrality with local interactions
Ballester et al. is the first to provide a behavioral foundation for centrality, in particular, Katz-Bonacich
centrality, using a complementary linear-quadratic-form network game6. They found that one’s network
position can fully explain the Nash equilibrium in such network games. Similarly, we show that when
the spreadability is smaller than one, and agents can interact for an infinite time period, their action levels
can be explained by both their structural positions, as well as their marginal benefits of actions (which
corresponds to nodes’ contributions).
In the setup of Ballester et al., agents choose actions optimally in response to their neighbors6. The
quadratic functional form implies that the utility of individual i, (ui), is quadratic in i’s action level (ai),
are dependent on i’s neighbors effort, and has a homogeneous marginal benefit α across the population,
ui = αai − 12a2i + β
∑n
j=1Aijaiaj , where α is a scalar and α > 0. Taking the first-order condition, it is
easy to prove that the strategy in Nash equilibrium is a =
(
I− βA)−1α ∝ cKatz, which is proportional to
the Katz centrality.
In the previous setup, Ballester et al. assume that the marginal benefit is homogeneous and positive.
We relax this constraint, allowing it to vary across individuals (yi) with and can take on negative values.
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With this, suppose agent i chooses an action (ai) according to the following utility function,
ui = aiyi − 1
2
a2i + β
n∑
j=1
Aijaiaj . (11)
With this variant, the equilibrium strategy becomes,
a =
(
I− βA)−1y. (12)
Eq. (12) has the exact same form as CC when T → ∞, βλ1 < 1 and β = p. Hence, we see that
contextual centrality approximates agents’ equilibrium actions with heterogeneous marginal utilities in
this condition.
1.4 Bounds and distribution of contextual centrality in terms of spreadability
In this section, we present the upper bound for maximum possible contextual centrality. When pλ1 is
larger than 1, CC approaches infinity as T grows. On the other hand, when pλ1 < 1, CC is finite for
T =∞, which can be understood as a lack of virality, expressed in a fizzling out of the diffusion process
with time. In fact, the specific value of pλ1 can be used to bound the maximum possible CC given the
norm of the score vector y.
Proposition 1
max(CC(A, p, T,y)) ≤ ||CC(A, p, T,y)||
≤ 1− (pλ1)
T+1
1− pλ1 ||y||
If, in addition, pλ1 < 1, then this is further bounded by 11−pλ1 ||y||.
Proof 1 The first inequality, max(CC(A, p, T,y)) ≤ ||CC(A, p, T,y)||, is clear.
Next we use the matrix norm ||A|| := sup{||Ax||/||x|| : x 6= 0}, which by definition satisfies
||Ax|| ≤ ||A|| · ||x|| for all x, and which coincides with spectral radius ρ(A) for symmetric matrices.
Since, for us, ρ(A) = λ1, we have
||CC(A, p, T,y)|| = ||(
T∑
t=0
(pA)t)y|| ≤ ||(
T∑
t=0
(pA)t)|| · ||y||
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≤
T∑
t=0
||(pA)t|| · ||y|| =
T∑
t=0
(pλ1)
t · ||y|| ≤ 1− (pλ1)
T+1
1− pλ1 ||y||
which, if pλ1 < 1, can be further bounded by 11−pλ1 ||y||
While the above result bounds contextual centrality from above, the actual value of CC is highly
variable, depending on the structure of the graph and the distribution of the score vector among its nodes.
For a discussion of expected CC among random networks, see the Erdos-Reyni section below. Next, we
discuss the behavior of contextual centrality when y is variable.
1.5 Robustness of contextual centrality in response to perturbations in y
As discussed in the main body of the paper, in the real-world data, node characteristics can be noisy,
stochastic and biased. Therefore, it is essential to analyze the robustness of contextual centrality in re-
sponse to small perturbations in y. We first perform a sensitivity analysis, studying bounds on the error
in contextual centrality in terms of noise in y, and then study contextual centrality as a random variable
assuming a multivariate normal model of y.
Sensitivity Analysis We let the observed (or estimated) score vector be yˆ and let y be the true score
vector. The errors in the score vector are given by the vector ∆y := y − yˆ and similarly ∆CC :=
CC(A, p, T, yˆ)− CC(A, p, T,y) is the error between the CC computed from observed and actual data.
We have the following bound on ||∆CC||, which follows directly from Proposition 1 and the fact that
CC is linear with respect to the score vector y.
Corollary 1
||∆CC|| ≤ 1− (pλ1)
T+1
1− pλ1 ||∆y||
If, in addition, pλ1 < 1, then this is further bounded by 11−pλ1 ||∆y||.
This shows that, when pλ1 < 1, then as long as the error in y is sufficiently small, the error in CC
will be small as well. However, the larger pλ1 is, the more a small error in y can become amplified as an
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error in CC.
Next we focus on the case that pλ1 > 1. In this case, we have shown in the main body of the paper
that for large T, contextual centrality is well-approximated by (UT1 y)U1, where U1 is the eigenvector with
largest eigenvalue. Thus in this case, the primary contribution UT1 y is an essential quantity whose sign
roughly determines the relative ranking of contextual centrality. Hence, we analyze its sensitivity to noise
in y. The error in primary contribution is simply UT1 ∆y, whose magnitude is bounded by ||∆y||. Thus
if ∆y is small enough so that ||∆y|| < UT1 yˆ, this perturbation will not affect the sign of the primary
contribution, so the relative ranking in CC will tend to stay fixed. Otherwise, the relative ranking is at risk
of flipping.
Contextual centrality as a random variable Next, to study the impact of stochasticity in y, we
suppose that y is a multivariate random variable with mean vector yˆ and covariance matrix Σ. Let
B :=
∑T
t=0(pA)
t. Since CC(A, p, T,y) = B · y is a linear transformation of the multivariate nor-
mal variable y, it is also a multivariate normal variable, with mean Byˆ = CC(A, p, T, yˆ) and covariance
matrix BΣB.
To simplify, consider the case that Σ = σ2I, that is, the yi are uncorrelated and have the same standard
deviation σ. Then the covariance matrix of CC(A, p, T,y) is σ2B2.
That is, we have
Cov(CC(A, p, T,y)i,CC(A, p, T,y)j) = σ2(Bei) · (Bej),
where ei are the standard basis vectors.
In particular, the coefficients of CC may be positively correlated even when those of y are uncorrel-
ated, and their standard deviations are given by
σ(CC(A, p, T,y)i) = σ||Bei||
Note that, by definition of B, Bei = CC(A, p, T, ei), whose jth coefficients represents the expected
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number of times node i is reached by the diffusion process, if seeded at node j.
By Proposition 1, we have the bound σ(CC(A, p, T,y)i) = σ||Bei|| ≤ σ1−pλ1 if pλ1 < 1.
1.6 Differences between contextual centrality and centrality measures developed on weighted
networks
There have been some studies which generalize centrality measures to weighted or signed networks.
They focus on settings where edge weights represent the strength or the trustiness (a friend or a foe) of
the social relationships. The network information captured by these centrality measures can be regarded
as a special case of a weighted version of contextual centrality, where A is a weighted matrix, p = 1 and
y = 1. Weights on network links emphasize social relationships but do not capture the heterogeneous
contributions of the nodes - exogenous to the network structure - directly to the cascade payoff. Weighted
links and weighted nodes characterize different network dynamics and diffusion objective. Let us provide
a simple illustrative example to explain the differences better. Imagine a network with two disconnected
communities, where one component consists of positive links and the other consists of negative links.
Centrality developed on the weighted or signed network will rank the most-connected node as the top in
the community with positive edges (i.e., individuals who all trust one another). However, for a particular
marketing campaign, if all individuals in the positive community do not like the product, seeding any
individuals in the positive community will hurt the campaign.
For readers’ reference, we provide an overview of centrality measures on weighted and signed net-
works. There are two main strands of work in this literature. First, some studies define new notions of the
shortest path that take the weights of the links into account. There are multiple types of modifications: (1)
take the inverse of the tie strengths as the shortest path lengths24,25, (2) using a tuning parameter to trade-
off tie strengths and the number of ties26, (3) adding a temporal aspect to links to minimize the temporal
latency27. With these new notions, researchers extend existing path-based centrality measures.24 and25
extended closeness centrality and betweenness centrality to define the shortest path algorithm to be the
least costly path with cost depending solely on tie weights. Opshal proposes a centrality measure with a
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generalized degree and shorted paths computation by adding a tuning parameter on tie strengths26. An-
other strand of studies focused on the flow and diffusion processes. Kunegis developed a signed centrality
measure using the left eigenvector of the signed network as a generalization of the eigenvector centrality
with weighted edges28. Other studies develop algorithm-based ranking methods, extending PageRank
or HITS. Shahriari computed the difference between the scores using PageRank or HITS algorithms for
networks consisting of positive and negative links, respectively, as the new measure29
1.7 Theoretical results of contextual centrality for Erdos-Renyi networks
In the case that A corresponds to an Erdos-Renyi graph G(n, q), we have further theoretical results, in
line with the results of Banerjee et al.7 on diffusion centrality. As is standard for Erdos-Renyi graphs,
we assume each edge has independent probability q of being present in the graph, where q is a function
of n, the number of nodes. Assume that qn grows such that log(n) ≤ qn ≤ √n. We also assume that
T and p are functions of n, and let y denote the vector (depending on n) consisting of y1, . . . , yn for
some infinite sequence {yi}. We suppress all dependency on n for ease of notation. We further assume
that the mean y has a limit y as n approaches infinity, which is reasonable by the law of large numbers
if the yi are sampled from a random variable. With this background, we study the expected behavior of
E(CC(A, p, T,y)).
Given two functions f(n), g(n), we will say that f approaches g as n approaches infinity, if limn→∞
f(n)
g(n) =
1. Then we have the following result.
Theorem 1 Suppose T = o(qn) and log(n) ≤ qn ≤ √n. Then we can decomposeE(CC(A, p, T,y)i) =
yE1 + yiE2, where E1 and E2 are functions of n, p, q, T but do not depend on y or i, such that
a)E1 approaches
1−(npq)T+1
1−(npq) .
b)E2 = o(E1).
c)If y 6= 0, then E(CC(A, p, T,y)) approaches yE(DC(A, p, T,y)), where DC is diffusion central-
ity.
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In other words, if y 6= 0, then the term E1 dominates, so the expected CC is uniform all nodes (in the
limit as n approaches infinity). Moreover, y measures the magnitude of the diffusion as compared to DC,
and the sign of y determines the expected sign of CC. In contrast, if y = 0, then CC equals E2 so, on
expectation, CC correlates perfectly with y itself. We note that in practice it is not likely for y to equal
0. However, if y is close to 0 and n is not too large, then the term E2 could still be significant, indicating
that the expected CC will be correlated with the nodal evaluation vector y.
This result can also be related to the tradeoff in Eq. (6). As implied by the Theorem, as long as y¯ 6= 0,
then expected CC approaches Y¯ E1, which in turn approaches y¯E(DC) as n approaches infinity. Thus
the second term of the tradeoff in Eq. (6) dominates, on expectation.
We also note that careful analysis will show that E2 > 0, but that is beyond the scope of the present
paper.
Theorem 2 If pλ1 ≥ (1 + ) for some  > 0, then T = log(n)log(npq) is a threshold for viral spread if y 6= 0,
in the sense that
a)If T ≤ (1− ) log(n)log(npq) for some  > 0, then E(CC(A, p, T,y)i) = o(n) for all i.
b)If, on the other hand, T ≥ (1 + )( log(pnq)log(n) ), then E(CC(A, p, T,y)i) = Ω(n) for all i.
Note that the threshold T = log(n)log(npq) given above is equal to
log(n)
log(pE(λ1))
, since E(λ1) = nq. We also note
that the expected diameter of the Erdos-Reyni graph is log(n)log(nq) , which is strictly smaller than the threshold
given above.
To prove these theorems, we analyze E(At) for any t. Note that E(At)ij is the weighted sum of all
paths of length t from i to j, with each path pi weighted by qd(pi), where d(pi) is the number of distinct
edges along the path pi. Note that by symmetry, the off-diagonal entries of E(At) are all the same, as are
its diagonal entries; however, the diagonal entries are not necessarily equal to the off-diagonal ones.
We first prove the following lemma to aid our analysis.
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Lemma 1 Let i, j, k be distinct numbers ranging from 1 to n. Let Zij,k(t) be the subset of paths of length
t from i to j which visit vertex k at some point. Let zij,k(t) be its weighted sum
∑
pi∈Zij,k(t) q
d(pi). Then
zij,k ≤ t−1n−2E(Atij).
Proof 2 There are (t − 1) possible indices to place the vertex k. For each fixed index, the weighted sum
of all paths with vertex k at that index is ≤ 1n−2E(Atij), which follows by symmetry with respect to the
n− 2 possible choices of k. Combining these factors yields the desired bound.
We now move on to the estimates of E(Atij).
Lemma 2 For the purposes of this lemma assume that tnq ≤ r < 14 for some r. Then we have
a) (1− 2r) (nq)tn ≤ E(At)ij ≤ ( 11−4r ) (nq)
t
n , if i 6= j or if i = j and t is odd.
b) (1− 2r) (nq)tn ≤ E(At)ii ≤ ( 11−4r )( (nq)
t
n + (2nq)
t/2) if t is even.
Proof 3 Let us represent a path by the sequence of the vertices it visits. A path pi of length t from i to j is
represented as iv1v2 · · · vt−1j, where i and j will also be labeled v0 and vt, respectively.
We begin by proving the lower bounds. We have E(Atij) ≥ (n− 2)t−1qt. Indeed, there are more than
(n− 2)t−1 legitimate paths in Xij(t) (under the constraint of no self-edges), and each one has at most t
distinct edges. Now, (n− 2)t−1 ≥ nt−1 − 2t(n)t−2 = nt−1(1− 2tn ) ≥ (1− 2r)nt−1 since tn ≤ tqn ≤ r.
Next, we calculate the upper bounds. Suppose that t ≥ 1. Let Yij(t) ⊂ Xij(t) consist of those
paths in which edges are never repeated immediately, that is, vl 6= vl+2 for any index l. Let yij(t) =∑
pi∈Yij(t) q
d(pi) be its weighted sum. We further partition Yij(t) as follows. For each k = 1, . . . , (t− 1),
let Yij,k(t) ⊂ Yij(t) be the subset of those paths for which k is the smallest index such that the edge
vk−1vk is not revisited later in the path, and vk 6= j. Then Yij(t) =
⊔t−1
k=0 Yij,k(t). Let yij,k(t) be the
weighted sum of Yij,k(t). Also, let ydiff (t) and ysame(t) denote the values of yij(t) in the cases i 6= j
and i = j, respectively.
We will use the following properties for paths pi ∈ Yij,k(t). Given pi, let pi′ ∈ Yvkj(t − k) be the
truncated path vk, . . . , vt−1, j. We note that pi has at least one edge that pi′ does not, namely vk−1vk,
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by definition of k. Thus d(pi) ≥ d(pi′) + 1. Furthermore, we note that every node v1, . . . , vk−1 must be
present in pi′. Indeed, for each such vertex v, consider the greatest index l such that vl = v. If l < k, then,
by definition of k, that means either vl = j, in which case it appears in pi′, or the edge vl−1vl reappears
later in the path. By assumption that pi ∈ Yij(t), this edge cannot be repeated immediately; hence v = vl
itself must reappear later, contradicting the description of the index l. So, l ≥ k, that is, v indeed appears
in pi’.
These observations imply the following bound:
yij,k(t) ≤ tk−1nqydiff (t− k) (13)
Indeed, to specify a path in Yij,k(t), we first choose vk from among ≤ n possibilities. Then we choose
the truncated path pi′ as described above from Yvkj(t− k), whose weighted sum is yvk,j(t− k). Then we
choose the k − 1 vertices v1, . . . , vk−1. Each of them is repeated in pi′, hence may be chosen from among
the ≤ t vertices of pi′. Finally, since d(pi) ≥ d(pi′) + 1, we introduce the additional factor of q.
Now we focus on the case that i 6= j.
If k ≥ 1, we can improve our bound further. Notice that, since k > 1, the starting vertex i must
appear in the path pi′. So, either i = vk, or i 6= vk. In the former case, we can eliminate a factor of n
from (13), and in the latter case, we can introduce a factor of tn into (13), by Lemma 1 (Note the Lemma
applies since i, j, and vk are assumed distinct). We thus obtain the tighter bound
yij,k(t) ≤ tkq · ydiff (t− k) (14)
Now we can prove by induction that ydiff (t) ≤ (nq + 2)t. Indeed, under this inductive hypothesis,
the above bounds yield
yij,1(t) ≤ nq(nq + 2)t−1
and
t−1∑
k=2
yij,k(t) ≤
∞∑
k=2
tqk(nq + 2)t−k ≤ t2q(nq + 2)t−2 1
1− r
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≤ 2(nq + 2)t−1
Where we used the fact that (t2) ≤ (nq)2 ≤ n and 11−r ≤ 2. Combining these bounds together we obtain,
as desired, that
yij(t) = yij,1(t) +
t−1∑
k=2
yij,2(t) ≤ (nq + 2)(nq + 2)t−1 = (nq + 2)t
Next, we plug in this bound for ydiff (t) into (13), to obtain a bound for yij(t) (even if i = j). We
have
yij ≤
∞∑
k=1
tk−1(nq + 2)t−k+1 ≤ 1
1− r (nq + 2)
t
Now, it is convenient to further bound (nq+2)t ≤ 11−2r (nq)t. Indeed, (nq+2)t =
∑t
k=0
(
t
k
)
2knt−k ≤∑∞
k=0(2t)
k(nq)t−k, which is a geometric series with ratio 2tnq ≤ 2r, bounded by 11−2r (nq)t.
Hence, we obtain the following bound on yij(t):
yij(t) ≤ 1
(1− r)(1− 2r)(nq)
t ≤ 1
1− 3r (nq)
t (15)
We emphasize that this inequality holds only if t ≥ 1. Finally, we extend our analysis from the Yij(t) to all
paths. Any arbitrary path from i to j of length t may be obtained by starting with a path in Yij(t− 2m),
for some 0 ≤ m ≤ t/2 and performing a sequence ofm insertions, replacing a vertex v with vwv instead,
for some vertex w. We obtain the bound
E(Atij) ≤
bt/2c∑
m=0
yij(t− 2m) · (2nq)m (16)
Indeed, for each insertion operation, there are two cases: either the inserted vertex w is already present
in the path, so it can be chosen from among ≤ t vertices; or it is not already present, in which case it can
be chosen from among ≤ n vertices and introduces a new edge, for an additional factor of q. Combining
the two possibilities, each insertion operation introduces a factor of (t+ nq) ≤ 2nq.
To evaluate this sum, we need to consider the two cases outlined in the statement of this lemma.
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a) Suppose that either i 6= j, or i = j and t is odd. In this case, note that the bound (15) can be
applied to each yij(t − 2m), since if t is odd, then t − 2m ≥ 1; and if i 6= j, we have yij(0) = 0
regardless. Combining these bounds with (16), we obtain
E(Atij) ≤
1
(1− 3r)
∞∑
m=0
1
n
2m(nq)t−m ≤ 1
1− 4r
1
n
(nq)t
by a geometric series with ratio 2nq < r. This completes the proof of part a) of the lemma.
b) Now suppose that i = j and t is even. The sum in (16) can be analyzed in the same way as in a),
but with an extra term of (2qn)t/2 corresponding to the case m = t2 .
We are now ready to prove Theorem 1.
Proof 4 By definition, E(CC(A, p, T,y)) = E(
∑T
t=0 p
tAty). By linearity of expectation, this equals∑T
t=0 p
tE(At)y. Now, for each t and each i, we have (E(At)y)i =
∑n
j=0 yjp
tE(Atij). By separating
the terms with i = j from the terms with i 6= j, this equals nyptE(Atdiff) + yipt · (E(Atsame)−E(Atdiff)),
so we can write
E(CC(A, p, T,y)i) = yE1 + yiE2
where
E1 = n
T∑
t=0
ptE(Atdiff)
and
E2 =
T∑
t=0
pt · (E(Atsame)− E(Atdiff))
a) By Lemma 2, we know that E1 can be bounded
(1− 2r)
T∑
t=0
(npq)t ≤ E1 ≤ 1
1− 4r
T∑
t=0
(npq)t
where r = Tnq . Since we assume this ratio approaches 0, these bounds imply that indeed E1 approaches∑T
t=0(npq)
t = (npq)
T+1
1−npq as n tends to infinity.
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b) Next, we show that E2 = o(E1). Indeed, we again use Lemma 2. We have
|E2| ≤
T∑
t=0
pt · (E(Atsame) + E(Atdiff))
≤ 1
1− 4r (
T∑
t=0
(pt(2nq)t/2) +
(npq)t
n
)
so the result follows since both terms pt(2nq)t/2 and (npq)
t
n are lower-order than (npq)
t.
c) Diffusion centrality is a special case of contextual centrality in which y = 1, which has mean 1.
The result follows by part a), together with the fact that E1 dominates over E2 whenever y 6= 0 by part
b).
Next, we prove Theorem 2.
Proof 5 Suppose y 6= 0 and pE(λ1) ≥ (1 + ) and that. For Erdos-Renyi graphs, E(λ1) = nq, so
pnq ≥ (1 + ). In this case, it follows from Theorem 1 that E(CC)i approaches y(pnq)T . If T ≤
(1 − ) log(n)log(npq) for some  > 0, then log(|E(CC)i|) ≤ C + log(|(pnq)T |) for some constant C, which
equals C + T log(pnq) ≤ C + (1 − )log(n) so T = O(n1−) = o(n). The other direction follows
similarly.
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2 Supplementary figures for empirical analysis
2.1 Predictive power of contextual centrality in eventual adoptions
Here we include the supplementary results to examine the robustness of the predictive power of contextual
centrality in the eventual adoption outcomes similar to Fig. 1. We extend the linear regression models to
(1) without controlling for village size, and (2) with additional controls.
(a) Adoption of microfinance in Indian villages (b) Adoption of weather insurance in Chinese villages
Figure 7: Predictive power of contextual centrality comparing with other centrality measures without any
controls.
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(a) Adoption of microfinance in Indian villages (b) Adoption of weather insurance in Chinese villages
Figure 8: Predictive power of contextual centrality with additional controls. For (a), we use village size,
savings, self-help group participation, fraction of general caste members, and the fraction of village that
is first-informed as done in13. For (b), we use village size, number of first-informed households, and
fraction of village that is first-informed.
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2.2 Performance relative to other centralities on random networks
Here we show supplementary results corresponding to Fig. 2 with figures for degree, eigenvector, Katz
and diffusion centrality.
(a) Barabasi-Albert model (b) Erdos-Renyi model
(c) Watts-Strogatz model (d) All models
Figure 9: Performance of degree centrality relative to other centralities on random networks. Each plot
shows the relative change, computed as a−bmax(|a|,|b|) where a is degree centrality’s average payoff and b is
the maximum average payoff of the other centralities, for varying values of yσ(y) and pλ1.
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(a) Barabasi-Albert model (b) Erdos-Renyi model
(c) Watts-Strogatz model (d) All models
Figure 10: Performance of diffusion centrality relative to other centralities on random networks. Each
plot shows the relative change, computed as a−bmax(|a|,|b|) where a is diffusion centrality’s average payoff
and b is the maximum average payoff of the other centralities, for varying values of yσ(y) and pλ1.
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(a) Barabasi-Albert model (b) Erdos-Renyi model
(c) Watts-Strogatz model (d) All models
Figure 11: Performance of eigenvector centrality relative to other centralities on random networks. Each
plot shows the relative change, computed as a−bmax(|a|,|b|) where a is eigenvector centrality’s average payoff
and b is the maximum average payoff of the other centralities, for varying values of yσ(y) and pλ1.
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(a) Barabasi-Albert model (b) Erdos-Renyi model
(c) Watts-Strogatz model (d) All models
Figure 12: Performance of Katz centrality relative to other centralities on random networks. Each plot
shows the relative change, computed as a−bmax(|a|,|b|) where a is Katz centrality’s average payoff and b is the
maximum average payoff of the other centralities, for varying values of yσ(y) and pλ1.
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2.3 Average approximated cascade payoff for contextual centrality and the variations of
other centrality measures
Here we present the average approximated cascade payoff for contextual centrality and the variations of
other centrality measures. Note that the approximation does not hold for degree centrality when pλ1 > 1
and T is large. However, scaling degree centrality with primary contribution still improves the perform-
ance. Hence, we present it here.
(a) degree (b) katz (c) diffusion
Figure 13: Average cascade payoff for contextual centrality and the variations of (a) degree, (b) diffusion,
and (c) Katz centrality. The x-axis is pλ1, and the y-axis is the average cascade payoff, with the shaded
region as the 95% confidence intervals. For ‘degree adjusted’, ‘Katz adjusted’ and ‘diffusion adjusted’
centrality, we multiply the focal centrality with the primary contribution UT1 y. For ‘seed nonnegative’, we
adapt the original seeding strategy to seed only if the maximum of the centrality measure is nonnegative,
otherwise it is named as ‘seed always’.
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2.4 Comparision of seeding strategies when y(UT1 y) < 0
Here we show the effect of using different seeding strategies on the average approximated cascade pay-
off. For this plot, we generated random networks as before with contributions sampled from a standard
normal distribution, but redistributed the contributions to make the signs of y and UT1 y differ if possible.
More specifically, if the average contribution was negative, the individual with the largest eigenvector
centrality score was given the most positive contribution, the individual with the second largest eigen-
vector centrality score was given the second most positive contribution, and so on. We used an analogous
procedure if the average contribution was positive. Fig. 14 shows that seeding according to the contextual
centrality score tends to perform the best as long a pλ1 is not too large, after which seeding according to
the average contribution performs the best. For small values pλ1, seeding always performs as well as, if
not better than, seeding according to contextual centrality. As suggested by Eq. (7), seeding according to
the primary contribution yields similar results as seeding according to contextual centrality score as pλ1
grows large.
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Figure 14: Comparision of seeding strategies when y(UT1 y) < 0. Here we show the average approx-
imated cascade payoff generated by seeding the top-ranked individual according to contextual centrality
using different seeding strategies. The x-axis is pλ1 and the y-axis is the average approximated cascade
payoff with shaded 95% confidence interval. The line marked “always” acts as our baseline in each we
always seed the individual. For “average”, we seed only if the average contribution is nonnegative. For
“primary”, we seed only if the primary contribution is nonnegative. For “contextual”, we seed only if the
contextual centrality score of the individual is nonnegative.
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